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 Chapter 4 
 Free-Market Economics and Developmental 
Statism as Political Paradigms: Implications 
for Water Governance Theory and Practice 
in Developing Countries 
 Claudious  Chikozho and  Everisto  Mapedza 
 Abstract  Key actors in various developing countries are often confronted by dif-
fi cult choices when it comes to the selection and deployment of appropriate water 
governance regimes taking into account national socio-economic and political reali-
ties. Indeed, scholars and practitioners alike continue to grapple with the need to 
create the optimum water-supply and allocation decision-making space applicable 
to specifi c developing countries. This chapter uses case studies to explore the utility 
of free-market economics and developmental statism as two major paradigms that 
have emerged in the face of enduring questions about how best to govern water- 
supply systems in developing countries. The chapter establishes that increasing 
pressure on available natural resources may have already rendered obsolete some of 
the water-supply systems and governance regimes that have served human societies 
very well for many decades. It is also clear that national water-supply governance 
paradigms tend to change in tandem with emerging national development theoreti-
cal frameworks and priorities. Each nation or local government feels compelled to 
adopt a particular framework to fulfi l its needs taking into account the broader 
global water policy context. While many developing countries have adopted water 
policy prescriptions from the international arena, national and local socio-economic 
and political realities ultimately determine what works and what does not work on 
the ground. Local realities have also helped to inform how nation-states domesticate 
global concepts for their local purposes. Thus, the choice between free-market 
approaches and developmental state-oriented approaches is never simple, and 
hybrid models are often deployed. Indeed, the majority of countries and municipali-
ties rely on a mix of market economics and developmental statism to make their 
water governance regimes more realistic and workable on the ground. 
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4.1  Introduction and Background 
 The past six decades of changing development paradigms have seen alternating 
national and international water policies emphasise the state, user groups or markets 
as essential for solving water resource governance challenges. Closer analysis 
reveals that each of these solutions has worked in some places but failed in others, 
especially when attempts were made to pilot the solutions across many countries 
and diverse socio-economic situations (Meinzen-Dick  2007 ). But since the early 
1990s, integrated water resource management (IWRM) has emerged as the domi-
nant framework for guiding decision-making and planning in the water sectors of 
developing countries. With the observed and anticipated worsening of water scar-
city due to climate change and various anthropogenic factors that increase water 
demand, the push for IWRM has never been greater. 
 It is within this context that discourses on the importance of the “political para-
digm” for water governance in developing countries are usually framed. In these 
discourses, scholars and practitioners alike grapple with the need to create the opti-
mum water-supply and allocation decision-making framework applicable to a 
developing country, especially in Africa. The enduring question is no longer whether 
or not water should be managed purely as a social or economic good. Instead, it is 
now more about how best a particular country and its service delivery agencies can 
manage freshwater-supply systems taking into account the state’s developmental 
role while at the same time addressing the free-market economy imperatives evident 
in and promoted by advocates of IWRM approaches. At the same time, implementa-
tion is often constrained by resource limitations, structural adjustment programmes 
and poverty reduction strategies. 
 Analytical papers by several scholars indicate that traditional approaches for 
meeting increasing demand for water relied almost exclusively on centralised infra-
structure and decision-making characterised by big dams and reservoirs, pipelines 
and treatment plants, water departments and agencies (see Gleick  2002 ; Chikozho 
 2008 ; GWP  2012 ). These approaches, dominated by a supply orientation and reli-
ance on technical solutions to water problems, have since been discarded in favour 
of a governance regime that embraces user involvement in decision-making and 
more effi cient resource management. In effect, IWRM explicitly challenges tradi-
tional water development and governance systems. It starts with the recognition that 
top-down, supply-led, technically based and sectoral approaches to water gover-
nance and management impose unsustainably high economic, social and ecological 
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costs on human societies and on the natural environment. The water governance 
paradigm that has now emerged is underpinned by neoliberal approaches that 
emphasise, inter alia, a “rolling back of the state from the frontiers of development 
planning” and treating water-supply services as “economic” products that need to 
be paid for. It is a way of thinking that emphasises decentralised management struc-
tures, use of effi cient technologies and deployment of water pricing structures that 
act as both incentives and disincentives for “irresponsible” water use. 
 This chapter addresses two major paradigms that have emerged in the face of 
enduring questions regarding how to govern water-supply systems in a developmen-
tal state or in a free-market economy. We present the main discourses attributable to 
each of these perspectives and their implications in a developing country context. 
We acknowledge that the increasing scarcity and demand for freshwater has serious 
implications for how water is allocated and protected. We argue that in the face of 
new pressures on the resource, water-supply systems, models and governance 
regimes that have served human societies for a long time may now fail to cope. 
Therefore, this chapter brings attention and sharper focus on the need to deploy 
alternative tools and approaches to water-supply governance and management in 
order to protect and sustainably allocate this resource. The chapter also brings to the 
fore the fact that despite the dichotomy between free-market economy and 
developmental- state paradigms, in practice, elements of both paradigms tend to be 
combined, albeit in different proportions. 
 Well-known scholarship that addresses water institutions includes Rosegrant and 
Binswanger ( 1994 ), Barnekov et al. ( 1989 ), Saleth and Dinar ( 2005 ), Meinzen-Dick 
( 2007 ), Briscoe ( 2011 ), Beveridge and Monsees ( 2012 ) and Horne ( 2013 ). Most of 
these scholars partly focus on the benefi ts or disadvantages of water markets and 
provide insights about their utility in specifi c contexts as well as guidance on how 
they may be improved. Typically, most of them use economic effi ciency and equity 
perspectives as the point of departure in their analyses. Our goal in this chapter is 
more modest, that is, to show how developing countries may or may not deploy 
market mechanisms in their water-supply systems and what this implies in terms of 
effi ciency, equity and sustainability. We do not necessarily provide specifi c recom-
mendations about how to improve water markets; neither do we discuss best prac-
tice in terms of water institutions (see Saleth and Dinar  2005 ). Instead, we provide 
an overview of the key debates and major institutional underpinnings of water- 
supply sectors in developing countries and their potential performance under mar-
ket or developmental state-oriented planning conditions. This chapter is intended to 
inform practitioners, policymakers and theorists who grapple continuously with the 
challenge of crafting effective water governance systems in a rapidly altering envi-
ronment in developing countries. Section 3.1 focuses on key discourses, concepts 
and expectations relevant to the management of water in a free-market economy. 
Section 3.2 explores the major discourses, concepts and expectations relevant to the 
management of water in a developmental state. 
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4.1.1  Managing Water in a Free-Market Economy: A Brief 
Historical Trajectory 
 While understanding around the vulnerability and fi nite nature of water in the face 
of rapidly growing demand for the resource has a long history, it was highlighted 
together with the concept of the “right to water” in much clearer terms than ever 
before during the United Nations (UN) Conference on Water, 1977 at Mar del Plata. 
Since then, debates on water governance in developing countries have mainly 
revolved around the need to discard the long-held belief that water is a social good 
to be provided by the state, either free of charge or at very low cost. To proponents 
of this approach, developing and delivering new water-supply systems and sup-
pressing water prices appear much more politically expedient than focusing on 
charging higher prices and improving the effi ciency of existing supply systems. 
This approach was buttressed by the widely held belief that water was always going 
to be in abundance (Molle  2009 ). Ineffi ciencies in water use were either not detected 
at all or simply ignored. Thus, the failure to recognise the economic value of water 
led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the resource (Kevinsen et al. 
 2014 ). As Smith and Wang ( 2008 ) point out, solely searching for water supply-side 
remedies may mask overconsumptive or unsustainable behaviours that are acknowl-
edged during the critical self-examination that inevitably occurs when a water con-
servation approach is adopted. 
 Both the 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(Brundtland Commission) entitled “Our Common Future” and the Dublin Principles 
of 1992 heralded a signifi cant shift in perceptions about how water and other natural 
resources should be governed and managed, giving rise to the acceptance of the 
integrated approach embodied in IWRM. Guided by the Dublin Principles, govern-
ments, water management agencies, international organisations, civil society agen-
cies and others have engaged in a long-term change process to improve management 
of water resources (see FAO  1995 ; GWP  2003 ; Chikozho  2010 ). A product of the 
UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 
1992, Agenda 21, Principle No. 4, declared that “Water has an economic value in all 
its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good” (United Nations 
 1992 ). In 1993, the World Bank issued a comprehensive policy paper that basically 
reiterated that water should be viewed as a limited resource to be managed in an 
integrated manner to meet national objectives – economic, social, security and envi-
ronmental rather than as an input into specifi c sectors (World Bank  1993a ). Attention 
signifi cantly shifted from technical solutions to solutions of a managerial and insti-
tutional nature in the early 1990s (Schwartz  2008 ). This shift should also be under-
stood within the context of a broader neoliberal agenda led by the World Bank and 
the IMF during the same period that advocated reduction of the role of the state in 
development planning. 
 In effect, IWRM has been promoted in many developing countries by various 
international players such as the Global Water Partnership (GWP), the World Water 
Council, the World Bank and the UN, as well as national governments, as a key 
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means of improving access to safe water supply and sanitation and, more generally, 
alleviating poverty and improving peoples’ lives. In the process, “water as an eco-
nomic good” has evolved to take precedence over the IWRM principles of social 
and environmental equity (see Mukhtarov  2006 ; Mollinga  2008 ; Beveridge and 
Monsees  2012 ). Most of the key international water-policy players have either 
directly supported or advocated institutional reforms in developing countries whose 
backbone is the IWRM framework. In countries that have adopted the “water-as-an- 
economic-good” principle, the reforms that ensue have tended to drastically alter 
the relationships between the state, civil society and private sector players active in 
water supply and sanitation. The “water-as-an-economic-good” principle has come 
to be viewed as an important way of achieving effi cient and equitable water use as 
well as encouraging better protection of the resource (Chikozho  2010 ). The World 
Bank in particular came to play a central role in developing and promoting water 
management policies and reforms consistent with its interpretation of water as an 
economic good (Budds  2004 ). It embraced the principles of water privatisation, in 
terms of both private-sector participation in urban water utilities and the defi nition 
of private property rights over water resources, as a means of addressing the dual 
concerns of increased water-supply coverage and effi cient water resource 
management. 
4.1.1.1  Theoretical Underpinnings of a Free-Market Economy 
 A free-market economy basically refers to an economic system in which economic 
decisions and the pricing of goods and services are guided solely by the aggregate 
interactions of a country’s citizens and businesses. There is little government inter-
vention or central planning except as a guarantor of the transactional environment 
through development and enforcement of the regulatory environment (Coates  2000 ; 
Hall and Soskice  2001 ). In other words, goods and services are produced and sold 
with very limited interference from the state. Trading relations exist mainly between 
and among the producers of raw materials, producers of processed goods and ser-
vices, retailers and consumers. The laws of demand and supply determine the direc-
tion and speed with which goods and services move on the market (Jessop  2002 ; 
Perkins et al.  2012 ). Consumers express their choices through the decisions they 
make when allocating their fi nances to enable specifi c transactions to occur. A free- 
market economy is therefore, the opposite of a centrally planned economy, in which 
government decisions determine the direction that most aspects of a country’s eco-
nomic activity take. 
 Free-market economies are based on the assumption that market forces, such as 
supply and demand, are the best determinants of what is right for a nation’s well- 
being, and these are based on rational decisions made by consumers seeking to 
optimise or maximise their benefi ts from various transactions. While most devel-
oped nations today could be classifi ed as having mixed economies, they are often 
said to have market economies because they allow market forces to drive most of 
their activities, typically engaging in government intervention only to the extent that 
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it is needed to provide stability (Jessop  2002 ). In essence, proponents of free mar-
kets and privatisation assume that the private sector is inherently dynamic, produc-
tive and dependable. They also hold the belief that private institutions are intrinsically 
superior to public institutions for the delivery of goods and services. They have the 
confi dence that market effi ciency is the appropriate criterion of social performance 
in virtually all spheres of community activity (see Barnekov et al.  1989 ; Castro 
 2007 ). Although the market economy is clearly the system of choice in today’s 
global marketplace, there is signifi cant debate regarding the amount of government 
intervention considered optimal for effi cient economic operations in developing 
countries. 
 Debates surrounding the applicability of free-market principles in developing 
countries intensifi ed in the past few decades, especially with the failure of the 
socialist path to development in the late 1980s and the rise to prominence of neolib-
eralism as promoted by the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and 
their development partners (the so-called Washington Consensus). The major ideol-
ogy behind neoliberalism is that economic, political and social relations are best 
organised through formally free choices of free and rational actors who seek to 
advance their own material or ideal interests in an institutional framework that, by 
design, maximises the scope for free choice (Coates  2000 ; Jessop  1997 ; Perkins 
et al.  2012 ). Economically, it promotes the expansion of the market economy and 
monetisation of exchange in as many social practices as possible. From a political 
perspective, it implies that decision-making should involve a state that has limited 
substantive powers of economic and social intervention and commits itself to maxi-
mising the freedom of actors in the economy to engage in economic transactions 
that they consider benefi cial to their welfare (Jessop  2002 ). 
 In most free-market economies, calls for the liberalisation and deregulation of 
economic transactions within national borders and beyond have prevailed to the 
point where even formerly social democratic political parties decline to challenge 
them. This has also entailed privatisation of state-owned enterprises and public ser-
vices and application of market proxies in the public sector (see Hodgson  1992 ; 
Jessop  2002 ). Hoskisson et al. ( 2000 ) argue that as a political project, free-market 
economics seeks to actively promote rolling back of the state from its traditional 
and routine forms of intervention associated with the mixed economy and the 
welfare- oriented national state. It also involves a deliberate shift in public policy 
that leads to the roll-out of new forms of governance such as decentralised national 
planning and service delivery, privatisation and commercialisation of public ser-
vices such as water and electricity supply. 
 Presumably, these new forms of governance are more suitable for a thriving 
market- driven national economy (Stein  1994 ). This typically involves the selective 
transfer of state capacities upwards, downwards and sideways, as intervention is 
rescaled in the hope of securing conditions for a smoothly operating world market 
and to promote supply-side competitiveness on various scales above and below the 
national level (Jessop  1997 ). A shift also occurs from government to market forces 
and public–private partnerships. This shift refl ects the neoliberal belief in the prob-
ability, if not inevitability, of state failure and the need to involve relevant 
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 stakeholders in supply-side policies (ibid). If the state cannot deliver something as 
basic as water and sanitation, the argument goes that is a strong indication of a gen-
eral failure of public-sector capacity (see Anderson and Snyder  1997 ). Therefore, 
water scarcity becomes simultaneously indicative of a problem of poverty, of mod-
ernisation and of governance, and reforms are required to correct state failure 
(Goldman  2007 ). The extent to which the reforms and new forms of governance are 
applicable to a sector such as water supply remains debatable, particularly given the 
orthodox categorisation of water as a  public good in mainstream public manage-
ment discourses for many decades. 1 
4.1.1.2  Implications for Water Governance and Management 
 While very few countries in the developing world use the free-market economy 
principles to solely determine water allocation and distribution among various 
social groups, many public water utilities in Africa have been grappling with exten-
sive reforms as part of the implementation of IWRM. Such reforms have also been 
implemented in the context of broader public-sector reforms aimed at improving 
public service delivery across various government departments. 2 A key defi ning fea-
ture of these reforms is the introduction of management principles and practices 
associated with typical private-sector commercialisation processes (Schwartz 
 2008 ). These include using the laws of supply and demand to determine prices for 
water and strict commitments to making profi ts. The implications of these reforms 
on water-supply system effi ciency and equity are likely to be far reaching. 
 Implementation of the reforms on the ground has been characterised by two main 
approaches. The fi rst one is a situation where management of the water utilities in 
urban areas is delegated to the private sector through concession contracts or other 
contractual arrangements. The second is a strategy that retains management of the 
water utility in a public agency, but concentrates on introducing management prac-
tices associated with the private sector for both urban areas and irrigated agriculture 
(ibid). Introduction of private-sector management approaches usually results in 
changes to the water rights or licensing regime. The expectation is that water 
licences or rights can be eventually traded on the open market based on demand and 
supply while progressively “depoliticising” the water governance regime (see 
Hernández-Mora et al.  2015 ). According to Brown et al. ( 2009 ), many international 
1  Gravelle and Rees ( 1981 ) state that “The defi ning characteristic of a public good is that consump-
tion of it by one individual does not actually or potentially reduce the amount available to be con-
sumed by another individual”. Thus, individuals cannot be effectively excluded from using or 
consuming those goods, and the use by one individual does not reduce availability to others, e.g. 
fresh air, forests, fi sheries, water, etc. 
2  Schwartz ( 2008 ) states that the origins of this form of reform, often referred to as the  New Public 
Management , lie in New Zealand and the United Kingdom where it was initiated in the early 
1980s. These “reforms are a signifi cant part of the  new public management discourses that have 
been promoted by a broad coalition of sector professionals, donors and international development 
agencies”. 
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and bilateral donors and lending agencies have supported privatisation of water- 
supply systems believing that private-sector involvement is a means of removing 
politics from the sector and also a reliable source of investment capital. However, 
the extent to which such assumptions are realised in reality differs from place to 
place. 
 A major thrust of reforms in developing countries has been towards implement-
ing changes in arrangements within the public sector by increasing the autonomy of 
state-owned utilities and requiring them to manage resources such as water on a 
more commercial basis (Schwartz  2008 ). Broadly, new public management (NPM) 
reforms in the water-supply and sanitation sector share characteristics such as 
increasing the level of autonomy of the utility, separating regulatory tasks from 
service provision, creating quasi-competition in the water sector in terms of service 
provision, increasing tariffs to cost recovering levels and increasing customer orien-
tation and increasing accountability for the results produced by the water utility 
(Herrera and Post  2014 ). To ensure that the utility is actually producing the services 
that it is supposed to be producing, an accompanying regulatory framework is often 
developed and implemented which provides incentives for the utility to improve 
service provision. Consumers are expected to obtain access to water by obtaining 
formal water rights or licences. The state agencies and autonomous utilities supply-
ing water benefi t directly through increased revenues raised from water licences and 
permits. 
 In the long run, an expected offshoot of water privatisation and commercialisa-
tion is the emergence of water trading among users with formal rights to water. 
Briscoe ( 2011 ) points out that once users have clear, transferable property rights to 
water, they automatically consider whether they wish to forego a particular use of 
water in exchange for compensation from another user who may place a higher 
value on the water. Reallocating water then becomes a matter of voluntary and 
mutually benefi cial agreements between willing buyers and willing sellers and not 
a matter of confi scation or an endless search for new sources of supply by state 
agencies. Throughout the arid Western United States, for example, and in the 
Murray-Darling basin in Australia, water rights are considered as legal property 
and, under different rules in different states, allow for approved transfers between 
willing buyers and willing sellers (see Grafton et al.  2011 ; NWC  2011 ). Chile and 
Mexico are the other well-known examples of countries where formal water mar-
kets have been introduced (Horne  2013 ). It has also become an issue for debate in 
the UK as part of the UK’s reconsideration of abstraction management. However, in 
most developing countries, water markets mainly consist of informal agreements 
between neighbouring farmers about how to share supplied or extracted water for 
their mutual benefi t. Typically, this involves one farmer allowing access to water to 
another user in exchange for a fi nancial or nonfi nancial payment (Briscoe  2011 ; 
Nikolakis et al.  2013 ). 
 Where the free-market economy is fully functional and an appropriate regulatory 
environment for water markets is created, effi ciency gains are noticeable. For exam-
ple, Horne ( 2013 ) states that the operation of water markets in the Murray-Darling 
basin provides an important example of the potential benefi ts of water trading for 
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irrigators, communities and the environment. Generally, water markets in this basin 
account for over 80 % of both the water entitlement trade and the trade in seasonal 
allocations (or trade in actual water) nationally. Tradability of water and water 
assets follows complex rules, and for the most part, trading in surface water entitle-
ments occurs only in relation to regulated water fl ows within and between valleys, 
provided there are no hydrological reasons inhibiting trade (NWC  2012 ; National 
Water Market  2012 ). 
 In the face of increasing water stress, it is possible that more countries will turn 
towards legal, formally managed water markets which enable them to shift water 
from low-value to high-value uses (Briscoe  2011 ). One would also imagine that 
once the free-market economy approach is deployed, policy and legislation govern-
ing water allocation and supply systems inevitably treat water as an economic good. 
The “user-pays” and “polluter-pays” principles are then applied to enhance water 
governance effi ciency. 3 Application of these principles also implies running the 
water sector on a cost-recovery basis so that it becomes self-fi nancing instead of 
relying on government budgetary allocations and subsidies. It also means charging 
higher prices for water than before in order to recover all costs of supplying the 
water to users (see Herrera and Post  2014 ). In such a case, companies and individu-
als whose activities cause water pollution have to obtain water pollution permits. 
They are then charged certain prices (penalties) according to the level of pollution 
they cause. The money raised is intended to be used to correct any environmental 
damage caused by the pollution. 
 Another common feature of managing water in a free-market economy (and 
indeed an important one) is the emphasis on water conservation and demand man-
agement (WDM). This is perhaps best showcased in urban areas where human pop-
ulation continues to be more concentrated and also in irrigated agriculture which 
tends to be a major water-use sector in most countries (see Gleick  2002 ). In devel-
oping country urban water-supply systems, unaccounted-for water often averages 
between 40 % and 60 % resulting from old infrastructure and burst or leaking pipes. 
Efforts to address such water losses through conservation measures and WDM often 
bear impressive results (Brandes and Ferguson  2004 ; Schwartz  2008 ; Da-ping et al. 
 2011 ). As Gumbo ( 2004 ) points out, the argument for WDM is sound and convinc-
ing: if there is a shortage of water for urban supplies, do not limit the solution to 
supply options only, but also consider demand-side options, such as minimising 
water losses and infl uencing demand to more desirable levels through structural 
measures such as retrofi tting of water appliances, recycling and reuse, active or 
reactive leak detection and repair. 
 Useful nonstructural measures would include education and awareness cam-
paigns, restrictions on water use, water tariff structure policy changes and innova-
tive presentation of utility bills. In essence, WDM has evolved into long-term 
3  Correljé et al. ( 2007 ) state that the polluter-pays and the user-pays principles are both related to 
who should bear the costs of environmental degradation. Those who cause pollution should meet 
the costs to which it gives rise, and users of a natural resource must bear the cost of running down 
natural capital. 
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municipal planning that helps to avoid costly capital infrastructural expansions 
(Vickers  2001 ; Brooks  2006 ; Kevinsen et al.  2014 ). A study by Gumbo ( 2004 ) 
focusing on eight cities in Southern Africa concluded that cities such as Bulawayo 
in Zimbabwe, Windhoek in Namibia and Hermanus in South Africa, which have 
invested in WDM, signifi cantly reduced water losses (by at least 20 %). The same 
study also concluded that cities performing well in terms of WDM have higher 
water-supply coverage fi gures, with at least 90 % of the population having individ-
ual or household water connections, while cities that did not implement WDM 
approaches could not account for more than half of the water supplied. 
 Economic incentives and water pricing policy strategies are today’s powerful 
WDM tools, making this option more environmentally friendly and, at the same 
time, an economically effective alternative solution to balance supply and demand 
(Kolokytha et al.  2002 ). Pricing through metering allows water users to become 
more aware of local consumption and is a prerequisite for the implementation of 
volume-based water pricing mechanisms (Kevinsen et al.  2014 ). Switching from a 
fl at or fi xed water rate to a metred system and increasing tariffs have been shown to 
reduce water demand (Da-ping et al.  2011 ). The goals most often cited in discus-
sions of water pricing and tariff structures include effi ciency, equity and sustain-
ability (see Kanakoudis et al.  2011 ; Wichelns  2013 ). If set at the right levels, prices 
increase the possibility that consumers will better understand the prevailing perti-
nent costs and water scarcity conditions, and in the process, they will be encouraged 
to choose water volumes that refl ect an effi cient allocation of water between com-
peting uses over time. In Beijing, China, a new pricing system that linked the cost 
of water to the amount of water used signifi cantly encouraged conservation (Gleick 
 2000 ). A similar pricing system decreased average monthly residential water use by 
nearly 30 % in Bogor, Indonesia (Postel  2000 ). Regional water providers in South 
Africa managed to delay the construction of new water-supply systems by imposing 
higher rates, distributing water conservation equipment and educating the public 
(Gumbo  2004 ). 
4.1.1.3  Challenges of Managing Water Using Free-Market Approaches 
 It is, however, important to note that within the context of equity and pursuing 
national objectives of redressing historical imbalances in access to water, the free- 
market approach (particularly pricing) usually becomes a hotly contested subject. 
The notion that all members of a community must have access to an affordable sup-
ply of water for domestic uses and livelihood activities is widely accepted in most 
parts of the world. Thus, equity becomes particularly prevalent in discussions of 
water tariff structures, given that water is essential and that in many settings, a 
purely market-based allocation of water between competing users would deprive 
poor residents of their access to a safe and reliable supply (Wichelns  2013 ). From a 
theoretical perspective, one option for simultaneously addressing both equity and 
effi ciency through pricing is to deploy increasing block-rate tariffs. This is a pricing 
structure that provides some amount of water to poor residents at very low prices, 
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while requiring wealthier residents to pay higher prices. Increasing block-rate tariffs 
have been implemented in many countries, as they enable water agencies to estab-
lish a very low price for the volume of water required for subsistence, while charg-
ing much higher prices for water deliveries in excess of minimal requirements (see 
Evans et al.  2002 ; Madhoo  2011 ). 
 However, the use of block-rate tariffs has had mixed results in various countries 
and cannot, therefore, be considered as the automatic panacea to water pricing con-
troversies. For example, in several cases the incremental prices of water have been 
too low to motivate wise use on the part of wealthier consumers, and as a result, 
cost-recovery efforts have tended to fall short of initial estimates while the notion of 
sustainability remains unfulfi lled. In other cases, water-supply connection rates 
have not improved at all even after block-rate tariffs have been introduced (see 
Keener et al.  2010 ). This suggests that block-rate tariffs are not necessarily the sil-
ver bullet for addressing water pricing challenges. Even the best-designed tariff 
structure cannot provide benefi ts to poor households that are not connected to the 
supply network (Angel-Urdinola and Wodon  2012 ). Water is not a typical or an 
ordinary economic good, and because of its specifi c characteristics, it is diffi cult to 
apply economic theory to it (Lamoree and Van Steenbergen  2006 ; Anokye and 
Gupta  2012 ). In any case, water has no substitute, and if water for basic needs is 
treated as an economic commodity, it is likely to have serious consequences, par-
ticularly for the poor who often do not have alternative sources or substitutes 
(Grimble  1999 ). To this end, water utilities in developing countries should still con-
sider increasing their investments in expanding water-supply service delivery in 
order to increase access for the poor. 
 From the foregoing, it is increasingly clear that the establishment of water mar-
kets is neither simple nor a readily available panacea. Experience has shown that the 
establishment of water markets is considerably more complex and nuanced than is 
often assumed and that it is not enough to just extol the virtues of pricing (Briscoe 
 2011 ). For starters, ordinary water users understand a price as a payment for a ser-
vice rendered. In most developing countries where the supplier is usually a monop-
oly (and prices are set outside of the market), this means that the legitimate price in 
the eyes of users is that which it costs an effi cient producer (usually a public utility) 
to produce the service (Nickson  1997 ; Schwartz  2008 ). However, it is common for 
the supplier in Africa to be ineffi cient, and users are unwilling to pay for these ser-
vices under those conditions (Briscoe  2011 ). In addition, even under the most 
advantageous of settings, users will vigorously resist the notion that they should pay 
for  sunk costs which, in their eyes, have already been paid for by taxes or other 
assessments (Nickson  1997 ). 4 Pressure to increase cost recovery without addressing 
these fundamental accountability questions is a major part of the reason why cost 
recovery has been so poor in many countries (Briscoe  2011 ). 
4  In economics and business decision-making, sunk costs are retrospective (past) costs that have 
already been incurred and cannot be recovered. They are independent of any event that may occur 
in the future. As such, once committed, sunk costs no longer constitute a portion of the cost of 
production (see Baumol and Willig  1981 ; Sherman  2008 ). 
4 Free-Market Economics and Developmental Statism as Political Paradigms…
62
 A typical example is water privatisation in Bolivia in the early 1990s that 
occurred with total disregard for the concerns of the citizenry. It resulted in water 
tariffs that were beyond many citizens’ ability to pay, such that it became a very 
controversial issue and source of confl ict in Latin America, leading to a series of 
political debates, protests and even riots (see Castro  2007 ; Hailu et al.  2012 ). The 
concession was terminated in March 2000 as a result of massive public mobilisa-
tions that led to the withdrawal of the entire federal cabinet. The concessionaire’s 
subsequent attempts to seek redress in international courts failed dismally. An 
examination of the performance of the private sector with respect to water-supply 
connections for poor households in Jakarta, Indonesia, concluded that the Jakarta 
private-sector partnership contract had not been pro-poor, and the expected trickle- 
down effect did not materialise (Bakker  2007 ). New connections were preferentially 
targeted at middle- and upper-income households over the period 1998–2005, and 
the numbers of new connections had been lower than the original targets. The fail-
ure to connect the poor is not solely attributable to the private operators and identi-
fi es disincentives to provide individual network connections to poor households on 
the part of the municipality, the private concessionaires and poor households (ibid). 
 In 1981, Chile reformed its Water Code in line with neoliberal principles, based 
on private water rights that could be freely traded with few restrictions and minimal 
state regulation. International fi nancial institutions have embraced the Chilean 
model, claiming that it results in more effi cient water use, and potentially fosters 
social and environmental benefi ts (Budds  2004 ). However, the free-market Water 
Code has been the focus of a lengthy and heated debate, and attempts to modify it 
have been debated in congress for over ten years. Moreover, its implementation has 
been problematic, both in terms of failing to foster active water markets and the 
growing evidence of social as well as environmental confl icts (Hearne and Easter 
 1997 ; Bauer  2004 ). None of the purported benefi ts of water markets for peasant 
farmers in Chile have been observed in practice; indeed, the present mode of water 
management has had negative socio-environmental implications for peasants in 
terms of reduced formal access to water and increased vulnerability to drought 
(Budds  2004 ). 
 In other parts of the world where the water “marketisation” agenda has been 
vigorously promoted, various studies have highlighted the common use of non- 
institutional forms of resistance by citizens. These include violent and non-violent 
protests, vandalism, illegal reconnections and other forms of collective action. In 
Lima, Peru, for instance, citizens resisted attempts by the water utility to closely 
monitor household water usage by stealing and vandalising water meters with much 
greater frequency. For example, whereas 32 256 meters were stolen or vandalised in 
2000, this number increased to 85 176 by 2007 (see Ioris  2012 ; Herrera and Post 
 2014 ). In a number of South African cities, activists protested the installation of 
water meters, leading to arrests and criminal charges (see Conca  2006 ; Harvey 
 2005 ). In Durban and Tygerberg, for instance, citizens reconnected themselves to 
the water-supply system following service cut-offs for non-payment (Morgan  2011 ). 
High rates of service cut-offs for non-payment in Tygerberg and Cape Town actu-
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ally “sparked township revolts, making these areas periodically ungovernable” 
(Smith  2004 :389). Protestors also boycotted payment in Pretoria while in Durban, 
large crowds rallied in the water utility offi ces, holding 10-rand notes to symbolise 
the maximum amount they could afford to pay per month (Bakker  2010 ; Morgan 
 2011 ). In Lusaka, Zambia, price increases that doubled tariffs for middle-class users 
and more than quadrupled tariffs for low-income users became politically untenable 
when people protested, and the tariffs were soon reduced signifi cantly (Dagdeviren 
 2008 ). 
 Overall, the available evidence indicates that market-based approaches to water- 
supply governance that may have worked in some developed countries do not neces-
sarily apply in developing country contexts. This suggests that sensitivity to the 
socio-economic, institutional and political dimensions of water management is fun-
damental to successful implementation of IWRM (see Chikozho  2010 ; Beveridge 
and Monsees  2012 ). Closer analysis of the IWRM framework also reveals the nega-
tive effects of policy standardisation and formulation at the international level and 
promotion of policy transfer from the top downwards (Mukhtarov  2006 ). In this 
model, a network of international agencies, water experts and professionals have 
colluded to redefi ne the water resource management agenda in ways that promote 
transfer of neoliberal-oriented water policy prescriptions across the world. As a 
result, much of the IWRM decision-making prescriptions tend to ignore the social, 
cultural and political context, as well as the historical aspects within which these are 
embedded (Ashton  2007 ). 
 When a state adopts a free-market approach to water governance in a developing 
country, immediate questions arise regarding the extent to which the approach takes 
into account these institutional and political sensitivities (Bruns et al.  2005 ). This 
becomes a hotly contested terrain in countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe 
where deep-seated historical inequities in access to water have prevailed for a long 
time. It may be viewed as excluding previously disadvantaged groups from access-
ing the resource since pricing structures determined on the basis of economic effi -
ciency and cost recovery would be predominant (Bouchaud  2008 ). That is perhaps 
why scholars such as Mukhtarov ( 2006 ) and Butterworth et al. ( 2010 ) have argued 
strongly that IWRM was never a “people-centred” concept, having emerged from 
practitioners’ ecological concerns over the then-dominant utilitarian use of water 
supply and discharge. The approach runs the risk of legitimising existing power and 
access rights inequalities as well as oversimplifying the diversity of needs and inter-
ests of local actors (see Molle  2008 ; Saravanan et al.  2009 ). 
 Another controversial feature of the market economy approach is that it urges 
government to retreat from the frontiers of development planning by reducing the 
size and costs of its activities in the water sector, deliberately shifting from a supply- 
orientation to a demand-driven approach, based on the user-pays principle (see 
Nhira and Derman  1997 ; Schreiner and Van Koppen  2001 ). Policies and legislation 
are subsequently revised to suit the emerging water governance regime. Bithas 
( 2008 ) carried out an elementary microeconomic analysis, which demonstrated that 
even in cases where private water companies are given the mandate to supply water, 
constant state intervention is necessary to correct market failures and approach 
4 Free-Market Economics and Developmental Statism as Political Paradigms…
64
social full-cost pricing. Goldman ( 2007 ) argues that the key word is “affordable”, as 
many of these water-supply services have been provided in developing countries but 
have now been shut off because people cannot afford to pay for them. In this chap-
ter, our position is that, although there is an increasing recognition, at least rhetori-
cally, that neoliberal water-supply policies have failed to achieve the expected 
results; the marketisation forces set in motion since the advent of IWRM will con-
tinue to shape institutional reforms and policy decisions that may deepen rather than 
reduce inequities in developing countries’ water sectors. These processes require 
careful analysis and reconfi guration before they can work in developing countries. 
4.1.2  Managing Water in a Developmental State 
 The idea of a “developmental state” has proved to be one of the most attractive 
concepts in development theory and practice for several decades. Shortcomings evi-
dent in market-oriented approaches to the management of water and national econo-
mies at large have led to the emergence of a strong counter-narrative about 
macroeconomic policy and water-supply planning. This counter-narrative is based 
on the conviction that the state still has a developmental role to play even in cases 
where the free-market economy agenda is given priority (Dassah  2011 ). As Radice 
( 2008 ) points out, in the 1980s and 1990s, the concept played two roles in develop-
mental debates. First, it provided a coherent counter to the dominant neoliberal 
narrative that portrayed the market as the master institution underlying both growth 
and welfare such that by 1990, the developmental state had become the major ideo-
logical rallying point for those who wished to contest the appropriateness of neolib-
eralism and the Washington Consensus as a framework for effective governance and 
economic development in the global south. Sindzingre ( 2004 ) argues that the con-
cept of the developmental state continues to be the most fertile conceptual issue in 
development economics more than a decade after its formulation, for it has explained 
the exceptional growth performances of East Asian countries as resulting from a 
combination of economic, political and institutional structural changes. 
 By the turn of the millennium, the application of the concept had spread beyond 
these origins, but it is still useful to recall its beginnings (Evans  2012 ). According to 
Radice ( 2008 ), the developmental state remains one of the chief points of reference, 
both analytical and political, for those who reject the current neoliberal global order. 
Proponents of the developmental state strongly believe that since there are so many 
imperfections in developing country market economies, it remains the responsibil-
ity of the state to step in and lead national planning and implement specifi c policies, 
plans, programmes and projects to drive the national development agenda (see 
Dassah  2011 ; Deen  2011 ; Routley  2014 ). The concept of the developmental state 
itself was popularised in 1982 by Chalmers Johnson. It has since been written about 
extensively and critically analysed in tandem with empirical experiences of its 
application (Ayee  2013 ). 
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 The successful developmental state experiences of several countries in Asia such 
as South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, China, India and Taiwan have been 
repeatedly used to demonstrate how and why the rest of the developing world can 
and should move swiftly towards rapid economic growth (Edigheji  2005 ; UNECA 
 2013b ). Even with reference to Africa, there are scholars who strongly believe that 
the developmental state model of national economic planning is the way to go. For 
example, Taylor ( 2002 ) argues that of those countries in Africa that have recorded 
respectable levels of economic development, it is precisely the developmental states 
of Botswana and Mauritius that have performed well. It is therefore important to 
articulate the concept’s theoretical underpinnings and empirical application in order 
to generate relevant lessons for the rest of the developing world. 
4.1.2.1  Theoretical Underpinnings of a Developmental State 
 As an analytical concept, the “developmental state” has been described variously as 
one that places economic development at the top of government policy priorities 
and which is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal (see 
Mkandawire  2001 ; UNECA  2013a ). Some of the instruments often referred to 
include the establishment of well-functioning formal institutions, weaving of for-
mal and informal networks of collaboration among citizens and government offi -
cials and the utilisation of new opportunities for trade and profi table production (see 
Fakir  2007 ; UNECA  2013b ). According to Radice ( 2008 ), in contrast to the conven-
tionally polar models of liberal free-market capitalism and the state-socialist 
planned economy, the developmental state is seen as a distinctive political economy 
that combines elements of market and plan, linking a mixed economy to a politi-
cal–ideological approach that combines authoritarian technocracy with a relatively 
egalitarian distribution of income and wealth. 
 The developmental state has also been characterised as a state that promotes 
macroeconomic stability, as well as establishing an institutional framework that 
provides law and order, effective administration of justice and peaceful resolution of 
confl icts, ensuring property rights and appropriate infrastructure investments and 
advancing human development (Dadzie  2013 ; Ayee  2013 ). It is seen as a state that 
is determined to infl uence the direction and pace of economic development by 
directly intervening in the national development process, rather than relying on the 
uncoordinated infl uence of market forces to allocate economic resources (Johnson 
 1982 ; Taylor  2002 ). Elsewhere, the developmental state has been described as one 
that authoritatively, credibly, legitimately and in a binding manner, is able to formu-
late and implement its policies and programmes. In other words, it is a state that is 
capable of deploying the requisite institutional architecture and mobilising society 
towards realisation of its developmentalist project (Edigheji  2010 ; UNECA  2013a ). 
 UNCTAD ( 2007 ) points out that the literature on developmental states has 
focused their characterisation on two major features, namely, a developmental ide-
ology and a structure pertaining to the requisite institutions, norms and standards 
that can support the development process. Therefore, their  raison d’être is building 
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the political, administrative and technical capacity to support development, in what 
has been summed up as constituting the “software and the hardware” of 
 developmental states (see Kim  2007 ; Weiss  2010 ; Dadzie  2013 ). In short, the devel-
opmental state is understood, at one level, to be a unitary actor vis-à-vis markets, 
social forces and international pressures. It is also conceptualised as a set of institu-
tions that structure the behaviour, preferences and strategies of all political actors, 
inside and outside of the actual state apparatus (Wong  2004 ). Ultimately, robust 
state- intervention measures determine the nature and pace of socio-economic prog-
ress (Routley  2014 ). The implications of this state-centric paradigm, both as an 
empirical reality to be studied and a theoretical construct to be debated, are far 
reaching, particularly when one considers governance of a resource sector such as 
water and sanitation. 
 It is also important for scholars to understand that in East Asia where the concept 
was successfully tried out and popularised, government development policies were 
neither socialist in design, nor did they promote completely unfettered markets 
(Fakir  2007 ). The East Asian experience, and the role of the state in facilitating post- 
war growth, confounded existing capitalism–socialism and North–South debates 
(Johnson  1999 ). When understood against this ideologically charged context, it 
becomes easier to understand how the examples of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
are often regarded as the living prototypes of developmentalism. Krieckhaus ( 2002 ) 
states that many East Asian countries have obtained economic growth rates unparal-
leled in human history, with per capita income roughly doubling every decade over 
the past 30 years. Therefore, they were post-war anomalies whose experiences still 
demand explanation (Leftwich  2005 ). 
 Some of the key factors that have been identifi ed as necessary ingredients for the 
emergence and sustenance of developmental states include the establishment of 
production-oriented private sectors and performance-oriented governance gener-
ally, which essentially refers to fully functional and effective institutions (Meyns 
and Musamba  2010 ). Beyond merely identifying and stressing the importance of 
these factors in the emergence of developmental states, the literature has also exten-
sively examined the processes by which they can and should be put in place. For 
example, the developmental states in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan used public 
policy instruments to allocate productive resources rather than relying solely on the 
market (Bagchi  2000 ; Kim  2007 ). They also targeted certain industrial sectors in 
their allocation of resources, sometimes playing a leadership role in prospecting 
potentially lucrative industrial sectors and at other times playing a followership role 
in strengthening pre-existing private-sector initiatives (Wade  2004 ). 
 Through the creation of tariff barriers, the subsidisation of research and infra-
structural development, the use of export incentives and centralised control over the 
fi nancial system, the developmental state demonstrated how “getting the prices 
wrong” through government intervention into the market was an effective strategy 
to compensate for East Asia’s relative economic backwardness and to jump-start the 
region’s catch-up development (Meyns and Musamba  2010 ; Mkandawire  2012 ). 
The distributive consequences of economic growth were less important to the devel-
opmental state, provided that social inequality was never too severe and that the 
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trickle-down effects of aggregate growth continued to be felt (Haggard  2004 ; Shaw 
 2012 ). The developmental state was also defi ned by its ability to balance strategic 
linkages with, and relative autonomy from, different societal forces thereby avoid-
ing the threat of elite capture. As Fakir ( 2007 ) points out, undergirding all these is 
the autonomy of the state from social forces so that it can use its capacities to devise 
long-term economic policies unencumbered by claims of myopic private interests. 
 One can infer from the foregoing discussion that the developmental state is able 
to craft a vision that it will relentlessly pursue in search of a solid economic devel-
opment path. It is prepared to do whatever it takes to realise that vision and hence 
the deployment of both market-oriented approaches and state-led development 
strategies, practices and projects. It is able to assess its capacity and identify the 
public and private-sector ingredients it needs to deliver that vision. We propose in 
this chapter that key attributes of a developmental state will include dosages of 
pragmatism, authoritarianism, economic expediency, entrepreneurship and innova-
tion. The developmental state is also able to rise above and sidestep elite capture 
tendencies and ensure the emergence of a more egalitarian society. 
4.1.2.2  Implications for Water Governance and Management 
 The “Asian miracle” has already demonstrated that it is possible for countries in the 
developing world to apply the developmental state model and achieve rapid socio- 
economic development. From a water and sanitation supply perspective, the devel-
opmental state would essentially focus on the effective delivery of services using 
various instruments. In any case, availability of water in suffi cient quantities and 
quality is crucial to the achievement of socio-economic development in any country. 
The developmental state is expected to provide the essential water infrastructure 
and services necessary to help catalyse economic development and improve the 
livelihoods of all communities. Fakir ( 2007 ) states that the state does this primarily 
by regulating, administering, executing, mediating, investing and delivering the 
construction, operations, maintenance and servicing of water service delivery 
infrastructure. 
 In a developmental state, the public service not only focuses on specifi c infra-
structural outputs but is also acutely aware of the “soft” (policy and institutional) 
issues critical to sustainable governance of the sector. It strives to deliver water 
services in ways that are effi cient and effective and to maintain the dignity of citi-
zens by ensuring that even poorer sections of society have access to a basic level of 
water supply and sanitation. The developmental state will use its agencies to pro-
vide water and sanitation services but will also embrace the potential contribution 
and competitive advantage of the private sector. As Bagchi ( 2000 ) points out, one 
important feature of a successful developmental state is its ability to switch gears 
from market-directed to state-directed growth, or vice versa depending on geopoliti-
cal circumstances, as well as combining both market and state direction in a syner-
gistic manner, when opportunity beckons. In other words, when managing water in 
a developmental state, the government is likely to facilitate the emergence of a 
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mixed economy in which the arm most suitable to provide water services at a par-
ticular point in time and place will be given the opportunity to do so. The use of 
public–private partnerships becomes a readily accepted practice. Therefore, the spe-
cifi c competencies, skills and values required in the water sector of a democratic 
developmental state are defi ned by its development context, priorities and chal-
lenges as well as the specifi c institutional conditions that exist or may need to be 
created to enable realisation of a specifi c vision. 
4.1.2.3  Challenges of Managing Water in a Developmental State 
 A key aspect raised in most of the criticism on the notion of a developmental state 
is that the effectiveness of the developmental state is severely restricted in contem-
porary times. National and global ideological, economic and political changes have 
resulted in its formation and operationalisation becoming an impossibility. Thus, 
even the Asian developmental states would fi nd it diffi cult to replicate their perfor-
mances in contemporary times (see Meyns and Musamba  2010 ; Deen  2011 ). For 
instance, key actors in the water sectors of developing countries now have to deal 
with new challenges and pressures that were non-existent in the past. These include 
increasing water demand, climate change, increasing demands for better democratic 
dispensations and declining fi nancial resources for water infrastructure. These chal-
lenges require new forms of governance and planning that may not be suffi ciently 
addressed by one model of development planning. 
 Another challenge that arises when managing water in a developmental state is 
that the state itself is conceptualised as normative and better, particularly in terms of 
its capacity. It is this which underpins the debate about whether a state is strong or 
weak. However, we already know that many developing countries do not have the 
capacity to deliver on public services (water included). As Gainsborough ( 2009 ) 
points out, the trouble with the “developmental state” literature is that discussion of 
the state is underpinned by a series of assumptions about what the state is which are 
not universally valid. Thus, while one can analyse developing countries in terms of 
whether they measure up to Weberian notions of state capacity, it seems much more 
sensible to try and understand that they are non-Weberian in the majority of cases 
and do not necessarily have the capacity required to assume the role of a develop-
mental state. For non-Weberian states, politics is much more about patronage and 
much less about delivering “public goods” such as water-supply development (ibid). 
As a result, water governance is negatively affected by limitations in state 
capacity. 
 Historically, many developmental states have been based on various forms of 
nondemocratic political regimes (see Fritz and Menocal  2007 ). However, the fact 
that it is possible to name a good number of authoritarian developmental states does 
not settle the issue. It certainly does not imply that all authoritarian regimes are 
developmental. It also does not mean that states need to be authoritarian in order to 
be developmental (ibid). Unfortunately, there are many examples of “anti-” or non-
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developmental authoritarian states in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Managing 
water in such contexts will always be diffi cult, and deployment of the developmen-
tal state model in the water sector may prove fruitless. This point resonates well 
with Gainsborough ( 2009 ) when he states that state capacities generally cannot 
increase if a developmental commitment among the state elite is missing or insuf-
fi ciently resolute. This may be the main reason why so many donor-sponsored 
capacity-building initiatives have proven ineffective in various parts of the develop-
ing world. 
 There is also little doubt that building developmental states in a democratic con-
text does bring with it particular challenges which, for the most part, Asian and 
other historic success stories did not face. The dominance of the IWRM framework 
today, with its emphasis on decentralised water-supply and governance systems, 
makes application of the typical developmental state model almost impossible in 
developing countries. For one thing, democracy has an inherent tendency to dis-
perse power and slow down decision-making processes, and it also makes the state 
less autonomous and less insulated from societal demands (see Fritz and Menocal 
 2007 ). A majority of developing countries that have experienced a democratisation 
process since the 1980s fi nd themselves stuck in an unfi nished transition. In these 
“hybrid” regimes (combining traits of authoritarianism and democracy), political 
leaders confront increasing pressures to deliver, but state capacity remains limited 
and accountability mechanisms weak or even non-existent while development goals 
remain elusive (see Fritz and Menocal  2006 ; Rakner et al.  2007 ). These conditions 
have remained prevalent in many developing countries thereby limiting the possi-
bilities of establishing a developmental state. Water governance has so far been 
affected by the complexities arising from state incapacity. 
4.1.3  Discussion 
 It is clear that the level of state intervention that the developmental state paradigm 
requires contradicts neoliberal theory. However, discourses about the developmen-
tal state would not have been topical still today had it not been for the failure of 
neoliberal policies to bring about sustained development, particularly in Africa. 
Sindzingre ( 2004 ) points out that the Asian fi nancial crisis of 1997-1998 has been 
interpreted by mainstream analyses as a confi rmation of the irrelevance of the devel-
opmental state concept as well as the fragility and limited developmental character 
of its ingredients. We argue that this concept remains seminal and important for 
understanding the determinants of the economic failures of other developing coun-
tries, as well as the possible exportability of its ingredients to other historical and 
economic contexts, such as sub-Saharan Africa. The economic stagnation of sub- 
Saharan Africa and the failure to develop effective water governance systems may 
indeed be interpreted as a consequence of common characteristics and constraints 
of its states, in terms of history, economy, global integration and political economy 
rather than failure of the developmental state model. 
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 At the same time, there are key characteristic features of water supply and sanita-
tion that one cannot ignore even in a free-market economy. Due to the nature of 
water as a basic need, debates about water-supply governance are now increasingly 
framed within a human rights framework whose principles indicate that it is vital for 
all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. 
Realisation of this human right seems more possible in a developmental state. Free- 
market approaches do not suffi ciently address these requirements. Dassah ( 2011 : 
588) expresses this more aptly when he points out that “although not all state-led 
developmental efforts succeed, hardly any state has ever been successfully trans-
formed through market mechanisms only”. There is also suffi cient evidence from 
the Asian Tigers’ experiences demonstrating that national transformation processes 
can succeed with full involvement of the state (Castells  1992 ; World Bank  1993b ). 5 
 From the discourses presented in this paper and evidence from the published 
literature, it is clear that water is a location-specifi c resource which is usually mostly 
non-tradable, because markets for water may be subject to imperfection. That is 
why water pricing has rarely been effi cient and equitable whenever it is introduced. 
As Shah et al. ( 2005 ) point out, the physical, social, institutional and economic 
conditions characterising developing countries are totally different from those in the 
rich temperate zone countries, and the objectives are usually also completely differ-
ent. Analysts often overlook the fact that it took several centuries for the Western 
world’s water management to be where it is today. Therefore, the “one-size-fi ts-all” 
model of IWRM needs to be revisited so that it can be adjusted to suit country- 
specifi c socio-economic contexts. This suggests that deployment of free-market 
forces in the water sector may not be appropriate in developing countries. In its 
Economic Report on the continent in 2011, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) abandoned inherited market liberalisation in 
favour of a “developmental state approach” in which burgeoning growth would be 
advanced though sustained infrastructural, institutional and social development 
based on lessons from East Asia (Shaw  2012 ). This suggests that UNECA appreci-
ated the need for the developmental state model of governance to regain its visibility 
in Africa. Its application in the water sector will therefore be quite timely. 
 The irrationality of neoliberal policy prescriptions which underlie the offi cial 
water reform processes in sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, is typifi ed by the side-
lining of localised understandings of water resource management when most users 
at the local levels generally do not treat water as an economic commodity. Therefore, 
fl exibility is required for developing countries to adjust the reform model to their 
own specifi c conditions. In addition, the reduction of the state’s role in development 
planning and resource management seems untimely. The state cannot afford to 
remain a passive actor in a world in which forces of globalisation threaten to erode 
the basis for that role. It needs to recapture its critical role and ensure that the 
5  These countries were far from paragons of laissez-faireism and, instead, were highly dynamic 
economies in which the state played an active role to ensure high levels of accumulation, technol-
ogy absorption and conquest of foreign markets (see Mkandawire  2001 ; Stiglitz  2002 for more 
details). 
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nation’s policy and water governance institutional structures are suffi ciently adapted 
to local conditions and emerging global resource governance discourses. This point 
resonates strongly with the conclusion by Chabal and Daloz ( 1999 ) that even 
 neoliberal frameworks are tamed locally to meet the context under which imple-
mentation is taking place, especially in the context of Africa. The public protests 
against water privatisation and pricing in various countries briefl y mentioned in this 
paper demonstrate the importance of understanding the local situation suffi ciently. 
 While traditional water-supply schemes were mainly comprised of large, central-
ised infrastructure, emerging approaches are characterised by integration of water 
infrastructure with biophysical systems, taking into consideration the social, eco-
nomic, environmental and political factors that determine provision of water for 
ecological and human uses and a long-term sustainability perspective (see Brown 
and Keath  2008 ; Van de Meene et al.  2011 ). We argue that this more comprehensive 
approach to water governance is more easily attained in the context of a develop-
mental state. Precepts guiding the free-market paradigm produce a very narrow per-
spective that is not geared to address this comprehensive list of priorities. 
 We are also acutely aware that over the past few decades, dominant public policy 
discourses have frequently attempted to paint the distinction between public and 
private agency as quite sharp and clear, to the extent that one can make the sweeping 
generalisation that the world’s water problems are either due to the public or the 
private sector. However, most conventional successful water projects show that this 
distinction is largely artifi cial and that the public–private distinction has always 
been blurred. Participation of both private and public agencies in most of the world’s 
largest water projects may actually be the norm rather than the exception. Scholars 
such as Hill and Hupe ( 2002 ), Meuleman ( 2008 ) and Pierre and Peters ( 2000 ) argue 
that in reality different, and sometimes ideal, water governance approaches will 
rarely be deployed in isolation, but rather mixed or hybrid forms will be detected in 
practice due to the complexity of real-world situations. Indeed, environmental gov-
ernance scholars such as Kooiman and Jentoft ( 2009 ), Lemos and Agrawal ( 2006 ) 
and Pahl-Wostl ( 2009 ) contend that hybrid governance approaches are likely to 
deliver more sustainable outcomes. This suggests that a mix of developmental state 
and free-market approaches stands a better chance of attaining optimum levels of 
service provision while ensuring sustainability of the water sector. 
 Several scholars have already identifi ed numerous systemic and interrelated 
social and institutional barriers impeding implementation of sustainable water gov-
ernance (see Farrelly and Brown  2011 ; Harremoes  2002 ; Mitchell  2006 ). Some of 
the barriers include institutional fragmentation, poor political leadership, unproduc-
tive intergovernmental relations, limited long-term strategic planning and inade-
quate community participation (see Brown  2005 ; Brown and Farrelly  2009 ). In this 
paper, our position is that only a strong and committed developmental state will be 
able to overcome these barriers. From our assessment, the implications for water- 
supply governance practitioners are also very clear. If free-market approaches are 
deployed, the key is an institutional framework that promotes effi cient and account-
able water service provision, with users being able to observe that their payments 
are actually used to improve the quality and coverage of water-supply services. 
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Without this, water users will not feel the obligation to pay. The design of water 
pricing policies is often complicated by the need to balance fi nancial sustainability 
of the service provider with the water users’ ability to pay. Historically, water has 
been signifi cantly underpriced, and therefore, sudden and steep price hikes can 
quickly escalate into a political challenge. Conversely, if tariff structures are not 
designed taking into account the broader social implications, price increases may 
disproportionally affect poorer households. 
 It is also important to acknowledge that the global fi nancial crises and recession 
experienced in recent years might have left champions of free-market capitalism 
facing an increasingly sceptical international audience. In this chapter, we argue 
that the failure of free-market approaches on the ground in other spheres beyond 
water is likely to leave scholars more sceptical about its applicability to the water 
sector. We further argue that there is already limited historical evidence to support 
the claim that free-market economic principles could be the main driver for success-
ful water-supply governance in Africa and other parts of the developing world. On 
the contrary, the historical evidence shows that profi t-oriented market approaches 
tend to produce highly exclusionary and elitist outcomes which are unlikely to ben-
efi t the poor. Chances of achieving universal coverage for water supply and sanita-
tion will be possible when nation-states adopt policy principles that give priority to 
the basic human right to water instead of market interests. It is our considered belief 
that such policies and principles are likely to be easier to deploy within the context 
of a strong and capable developmental state. 
 In essence, despite the attractiveness of the free-market economy, the debate 
about the role of the state in economic development planning and water governance 
has come full circle. With the onset of the global fi nancial and economic crisis in 
2007, many developed countries, led by the United States, undertook radical state- 
led fi nancial and economic intervention measures to rescue their economies from 
collapse. This has further broadened and strengthened the case for an active role of 
the state in economic development, particularly in the developing world. The con-
cept of the developmental state has therefore risen to the top of development dis-
courses once again, and its application in the water sector would be very timely. 
4.1.4  Conclusion 
 This chapter has explored in detail the implications of managing water in a free- 
market economy and in a developmental state. From the exploration, it is clear that 
national water-supply governance paradigms tend to change in tandem with emerg-
ing national development theoretical frameworks and priorities. Each nation feels 
compelled to adopt a particular framework to fulfi l its needs. In practice, more and 
more water utilities and planning agencies have been shifting their focus towards 
exploration of water-supply system effi ciency improvement possibilities, imple-
mentation of options for WDM within the confi nes of IWRM and equitable reallo-
cation of water among competing users and uses to reduce consumption and meet 
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future water demand. While many developing countries have adopted water policy 
prescriptions from the international arena, national and local socio-economic and 
political realities ultimately determine what works and what does not work on the 
ground. Thus, the choice between free-market approaches and developmental state- 
oriented approaches is never simple. Experiences across the globe indicate that 
careful analysis of local socio-economic and political conditions is crucial before 
deploying specifi c water-supply governance frameworks. The calls for the costs and 
benefi ts of water infrastructure developments to be distributed in a more equitable 
manner and for unmet basic human needs to be addressed urgently are most likely 
to continue growing in Africa and beyond. In this regard, more concerted efforts 
will be required to better understand and meet the diverse interests and needs of all 
affected stakeholders in the water sector. Application of the principles of sustain-
ability and equity will help bridge the gap between diverse and competing interests 
and unleash the potential for more innovation in water-supply governance. It is 
always important to remember that in water governance, context matters. 
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